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Borders discourage spatial interaction. The present paper gives a typology of possible backgrounds 
of such barriers. Five distinct ways of measuring border effects are presented and empirical results 
are shown for various transport modes: car, bus (public transport), train, plane. Border effects tend to 
decline in Europe, but they remain substantial, reductions of up to 80% are observed. They lead 
among others to low supply of border crossing transport links. A social cost benefit analysis of 
investments in international corridors is given. We find that border effects due to low demand for 
cross- border transport will lead to low net benefits of such investments. But the common practice 
that benefits of foreign users are ignored in social cost benefit analysis deserves to be reconsidered. 
By interpreting an international project as a joint project the benefits of foreign users are no longer 
overlooked, thus reducing the risk of underinvestment in international links.  
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1. Introduction 
Spatial interaction depends on generalized costs, which include the financial and time related costs 
of transport, but also broader types of transaction costs (Williamson, 1994,  Andersson and Wincoop, 
2004). Borders play a special role here, since they often imply a sudden jump in these costs. They 
correlate with fiscal and institutional differences, but also with cultural and language differences. 
Fiscal differences can be changed relatively easily by amending fiscal laws. But other types of 
differences are much more difficult to change. Therefore it is important to investigate the impact of 
borders on spatial interaction, and more specifically the impact of efforts to reduce border effects in 
common markets such as NAFTA, EU and ASEAN
2
 (Ratti and Reichman, 1993, Van Houtum, 1998, 
Geenhuizen and Ratti, 2001, Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). In the present paper I will focus on the 
European context. I will address the question of to what extent border effects remain after the 
process of EU integration which has emphasized the harmonization of fiscal and legal dimensions, 
and the deregulation of international transport.  
                                                      
1 De Boelelaan 1105, 1181HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands, E: p.rietveld@vu.nl 
2 These three common market areas are very different, both in terms of period of existence and in scope. The EU 
started already in the 1950’s and has gradually implemented a strong process of harmonization of institutions. 
ASEAN and EU started later and with less ambitions. 
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The main effect of borders is that they discourage spatial interaction. This is what we find in our 
empirical research, and it is also what follows from the large majority of the literature. Nevertheless, 
there are some distinct cases where we find the opposite: borders may also stimulate interaction. 
These cases are important enough to be discussed separately, and this subject will be addressed at 
the end of  section 2. 
The theme of the nature and size of border effects in spatial interaction is of course related to the 
subject of the advantages and disadvantages of border regions. When spatial interaction would not 
be hampered by borders, border regions would hardly be a relevant subject to study. An important 
question is to what extent border regions are more strongly affected by border effects in spatial 
interaction compared with non-border regions. For a good number of cases border regions will 
indeed be more strongly affected, like with cross-border commuting, and other types of short 
distance interactions such as use of private and public facilities. Cross-border polycentric 
metropolitan regions will have difficulties to exploit agglomeration advantages as long as border 
effects hamper spatial interactions of workers and firms.  For these themes cross- border cooperation 
of public and private actors may be of eminent importance (see for a survey on cooperation in some 
metropolitan regions in the western part of Europe, ESPON, 2010). Of special relevance are border 
regions where the construction of new infrastructure suddenly brings regions much closer than they 
used to be. Examples are the regions of Kent and Nord Pas-de-Calais in the case of the Channel 
Tunnel (Vickerman, 1993), and Copenhagen-Malmo in the case of the Oresund fixed link (Bygvra 
and Westlund, 2004, Hansen and Serin, 2007). Knowles and Matthiesen (2009) find for example that 
border related barriers explain why the use of the Oresund fixed link was underpredicted in the 
transport models. 
The aim of this contribution is to investigate the nature of the barriers implied by borders. In 
addition, the paper wants to shed light on empirical aspects of border effects:  to what extent do 
borders really discourage spatial interaction between regions? The focus will be on the implications 
of borders on the supply of border-crossing infrastructure.  A third aim is to explore implications of 
border effects for social cost benefit analysis of international transport infrastructure projects. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 a typology of border related barriers will be 
discussed. In this section we will also shortly discuss the potential of borders to stimulate spatial 
interaction. In section 3 we will present various ways to measure border effects and some empirical 
results on barrier effects of borders for various types of infrastructure. In addition to commonly used 
indicators for border effects we will also develop and use an indicator for the effect of borders on the 
supply of links in road and rail networks. Section 4 addresses social cost benefit analysis of 
improvements in border crossing links, followed by some policy implications in section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Types of barrier effects of borders 
Border related barriers can be defined to exist when the intensity of interaction in space suddenly 
drops at places where a border is crossed (see Figure 1). 
Various reasons of the existence of barrier effects of borders can be distinguished (Nijkamp et al., 
1990, Linders, 2005, Helliwell, 1996). Table 1 describes five main reasons. They derive from the 
following main domains governing spatial interactions: preferences, public sector policies, 
institutions (both formal and informal), information and infrastructure related costs (see for example 
Button, 2009, Rietveld and Stough, 2006). Given the fact that these domains are very different in 
EJTIR 12(2), 2012, pp. 150-166 
Rietveld 
Barrier Effects of Borders: Implications for Border-Crossing Infrastructures 
 
 
 
 
152
nature, it is not surprising that some of them are broader than others. As we will demonstrate below, 
the framework of Table 1 will also be helpful to interpret some specific cases where borders stimulate 
cross-border transport. 
 
 
Figure 1. Discontinous effect of border on spatial interaction 
 
The first group of barrier effects concerns preferences of consumers and producers for domestic 
interactions compared with international interactions. Such a preference may be based on taste: for 
example in food consumption one can observe clear differences in national habits, leading to a 
disincentive for the international trade in certain food products. Language, ethnical and cultural 
differences can lead to a strong preference for trade or communication partners from the own 
country compared with other countries. This does not only hold true for consumers, but also for 
firms. As indicated by Hofstede (1980), there are substantial cultural differences between certain 
groups of countries which makes cooperation between firms in different countries difficult. Another 
example is found with governments in their role of final consumer which may give priority to 
producers from the own country in the procurement of equipment, weapons, business services, etc. 
Table 1.  Barrier effects of borders 
Preferences Preferences of consumers for domestic rather than 
foreign products and destinations 
Public sector regulation Taxes or other limitations on cross-border trade and 
transport imposed by national states 
Institutions Differences in institutions  at both sides of border  
Information Lack of information on foreign countries 
Transport costs Weak or expensive infrastructure services in transport 
and communication for international links 
 
The second group of border related barrier effects concerns public sector regulation: taxes and other 
limitations on cross-border trade and transport (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). Such limitations 
concern import duties, quota systems for international trade, differences in tax levels (cf. fuel taxes), 
visa requirements, etc. These interventions can have both a monetary and a time effect on spatial 
interaction. Examples of monetary effects are the costs of getting a visa or special taxes levied on 
people crossing the border.  Examples of time costs concern the waste of time for getting visa, 
waiting at customs offices, waiting at borders etc. Avoidance of border delays is very important for 
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firms working with a just-in-time concept. It may induce the selection of domestic rather than 
international suppliers. To these time losses must be added the time needed for extra paperwork in 
the case of international trade. It is on this type of trade barriers that most common markets have 
focused. 
A third category concerns institutional differences between countries Institutional differences in labour 
markets between countries may imply a clear disincentive for cross-border commuting (Houtum and 
Van der Velde, 2004). The same holds true for differences in social laws and practices, health care, 
elderly care, education systems. For the introduction of particular new products in a country firms 
have to follow certification procedures. If each country has its own procedure this will lead to 
additional costs and possibility of delays. A related problem is that countries often differ in the 
specification of the requirements certain products must satisfy. This leads to the need to adapt 
products to particular national standards which obviously has a cost increasing effect. A well known 
example is the difference between the UK and other European countries in the choice of which side 
of the road is used leading to differences in automobile design. As indicated by Strassoldo (1998), 
differences in organization, language, attitudes and values probably have a strong impact on cross-
border flows, an impact that has a longer lasting effect than the physical constraints such as 
infrastructure that may be easier to remove in the short to medium term. 
The fourth reason for the existence of barriers relates to lack of information on foreign destinations. Lack 
of information always plays a role in the intensity of spatial interaction, but in border-crossing 
interactions it is more severe. For example many newspapers, data banks and information systems 
have a clear national orientation. Acquiring additional information is possible, but it gives rise to 
costs in terms of money and time. Personal information networks also often have a domestic bias. 
The information people have is strongly influenced by interaction patterns in the past. Thus, 
information related barriers to international interactions depend on the other types of barriers 
mentioned above (Cappelin and Batey, 1993). They can be said to reinforce them. Since the stock of 
information is built gradually, the historical component of barrier effects may be expected to be 
substantial. 
The last type of border related barrier effect concerns the supply of transport and communication services 
(Vickerman, 1993). This effect expresses itself in the form of various types of costs. If one would 
compute generalized costs, one would observe a discontinuity in these costs when a border is 
crossed. The generalized costs consist of two main components: monetary expenditures and time 
related costs. 
An example where there is an extra monetary burden related to international transport compared 
with domestic transport is in the railway market. In international rail transport the lack of 
cooperation between national railway companies leads to relatively high international tariffs. In 
telecommunication a similar tendency can be observed: international tariffs are often much higher 
than long distance domestic tariffs, even though the distance between the communication partners 
may be very much the same. 
Most cases of supply related transport costs of borders concern the time component. Take as an 
example railway infrastructure, where one observes that high speed rail developments usually start 
with domestic links (France, Germany, Spain). Only at a later stage international links are added. 
This means that the speed of services between major links in the same country is faster than between 
comparable links in different countries.  
The above examples concern time related barrier effects due to the absence of a sufficient 
infrastructure. A somewhat different barrier effect is due to the way infrastructure is used. For 
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example, train services at international links usually have lower frequencies than at comparable 
national links. This means that international travelers face higher inter-arrival times which lead to 
higher waiting times or a less efficient use of time abroad. A similar case holds true for international 
airline services. Rail transport provides other examples of barrier effects. Technical incompatibility in 
railway systems due to differences in gauge (for example between Spain and France) or voltage (for 
example between Germany and The Netherlands) lead to time losses when passing the border 
because one has to change carriages and/or locomotives. 
The border effects discussed above will have impacts on both passenger and freight transport. Their 
relative impact will vary among both domains in transport. Particularly, institutional differences 
have led to strong disincentives for international passenger trip making in for example the domains 
of work (cross-border commuting) and health care. Also delays related to borders during cross-
border trips probably affect passengers more than freight. Plat and Raux (1998) find for the border 
effect that cross-border traffic in Western Europe is reduced with about 79% compared by similar 
traffic that does not cross a border. For freight traffic a reduction of about 50% is obtained. This 
provides clear evidence that borders affect passenger transport more strongly than freight transport
3
. 
The above discussion of border effects focused on negative effects of borders on spatial interaction. 
In some cases, borders may also stimulate spatial interaction. This relates mainly to the first three of 
the five dimensions mentioned in table 1. Some consumers have a strong preference for variety and 
this will stimulate cross-border shopping and tourism. Differences in taxes may stimulate cross-
border interactions (Hansen, 1977, Kanbur and Keen, 1993), and the same holds true for differences 
in the fees for university education.  Further, when countries are keen on protecting domestic 
suppliers of transport services by imposing barriers to entry on foreign suppliers, the result may well 
be that domestic transport is more expensive than international transport. For example, before the 
abolition of the ‘tour-de-role’ in domestic inland water transport in The Netherlands, domestic prices 
were higher than international prices. Along similar lines, cabotage is the reason that domestic sea 
transport from the capital Jakarta to the various regional ports in Indonesia is more expensive than 
international transport between Jakarta and the port of Singapore. Further, institutional differences 
in the regulation of opening times of shops may stimulate cross-border shopping during for example 
Saturday afternoons or Sundays. Some of these interaction enhancing effects are clearly asymmetric: 
tax difference stimulates transport in one direction, but variety seeking may go in both directions. 
Nevertheless, as we will see in the next section, the overwhelming aggregate effect of borders is that 
they discourage spatial interaction. 
The theme of border effects on transport flows is of course related to the subject of the specific 
position of border regions. In Europe, the 20th century witnessed a reinforcement of the position of 
nation states (Maddison, 2006). This had a strong impact on the meaning of borders and hence made 
the position of border regions more pronounced. This was further reinforced by the increasing share 
of the public sector with its inherent domestic orientation. A special case was the creation of the iron 
curtain which implied a strong decrease in possibility of cross-border traffic. The issue of the 
disadvantages of border regions as places with low opportunities for interaction gradually was 
recognized (for an early study see Strassoldo (1970). Hansen (1977, 1981) placed the theme on the 
agenda of economists, both in a European and North American context. The Journal of Borderland 
studies was launched in 1986. The steps taken by the European Community towards the Maastricht 
                                                      
3  An opposing factor is that distances in freight transport tend to be longer than in passenger transport. Hence, the 
share of freight trips that will be affected by borders is larger than with passenger trips. However, given that a 
potential interaction would cross a border, the Plat and Raux result shows that the border effect is larger for 
passenger transport than for freight transport. 
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treaty of 1992 led to a strong boost of research on the topic. Multidisciplinary studies appeared such 
as Ratti and Reichman, 1993, Cappelin and Batey, 1993, Martinez, 1994,  Geenhuizen and Ratti 2001). 
Outside Europe the creation of NAFTA in 1994 clearly boosted interest in the theme of border effects 
and border regions. One of the current themes with border regions concerns the possibility to create 
and exploit agglomeration advantages in a cross-border polycentric context (ESPON, 2010). 
3. Measuring border effects on spatial interaction 
In this section we will discuss some alternative ways of measuring border effects on spatial 
interaction and transport infrastructure. We will focus on the effects of borders on flows, service 
frequencies and infrastructure densities. This means that we will not explicitly go into most of the 
underlying factors introduced in section 2. Thus, differences in densities at both sides of borders, 
physical barriers that may be related with borders (mountain ridges, rivers) and cultural and 
institutional differences that correlate with borders are not addressed explicitly. Their impact will be 
measured, but the precise mechanism will remain implicit.  
There is a large literature on international trade that addresses the impact of borders on trade 
(Rauch, 1999, Evans, 2003, Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). The typical model adopted here is the 
gravity model for bilateral trade flows. The first factor hampering trade is of course direct transport 
costs and this is usually dealt with in a rather superficial way by means of the distances between 
centroids of countries. The next factor consists of a range of factors related to the border effects 
mentioned above, such as trade barriers, differences in language, institutions, culture. Studies like 
Linders (2005) show that these factors have a large impact on international trade flows.   
These studies certainly shed light on border effects, but not yet to the full extent. Consider two 
countries like Canada and the USA, that have identical languages and rather similar institutions. 
Helliwell (1996) found a ‘mistery of missing trade’, implying that trade between a pair of regions in one 
of the countries is much larger than trade between a similar pair of regions, but now located at 
different sides of the USA-Canada border. He observes a border effect of no less than 80%. For the 
analysis of the border effect one needs data on trade or other types of spatial interaction that is 
measured at the regional level and where border crossing flows are incorporated. Data quality with 
this combination of regional and international is generally poor. 
The present paper presents some results by using various types of data and various measures of 
border effects. The first concerns the full estimation of spatial interaction models where formulations 
on distance decay are enriched with border related factors. A simple example for trade T between 
region i and region k would be: 
Tik = a. Pi. Pk . Distδik . (1-B1ik) 
where P stands for the masses of the two regions, Dist is distance, and B1 reflects the impact of a 
border in case the two regions would be separated by a border; δ represents the distance elasticity of 
bilateral trade. In the absence of a border between i and k, B1 would be equal to zero, in other cases 
we expect the border effect to have a dampening effect on trade. A broader discussion of the gravity 
model can be found in Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). It is important to note that many applications 
of the model are on the basis of national trade data, but when the focus is on border effects, the data 
should be at the regional level,  and data on cross-border flows should be available. Examples of 
work based on this specification can be found in Brocker and Rohweder (1990), Brocker (1998) and 
Plat and Raux (1998).  
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A second approach is based on control groups (see for example Knowles and Matthiesen, 2009; 
Neusser, 1985). The control group approach is based on the idea that observations with treatment are 
compared with similar observations without treatment. In the present context treatment relates to the 
existence of a border. Similarity has to be checked for the variables that are relevant determinants of 
the phenomenon under study, such as population and distance as determinants of spatial interaction 
between regions. A special feature of the present context is that the units of observations are not 
regions themselves, but pairs of regions. A pair of regions is determined, both located in the same 
country. A similar pair is then identified, but separated by a border. With similarity we mean that 
the sizes of the regions are similar, and also their distances. By this approach we control for the main 
explanatory variables in spatial interaction models. Then the border effect is reflected by the ratio of 
the flows between both pairs. More precisely, the border effect B is defined as the relative decrease in 
spatial interaction due to passing a border. So when Tik(domestic)  is the spatial interaction between 
regions within a country, and Tjl (international) is the interaction between a similar pair separated by 
a border, then the border effect is defined as: 
B2 = 1 -  {Tik(domestic) / Tjl (international)} 
A third approach focuses on the ratio of traffic intensities on a certain international link j at the 
border and the intensity close to the border, denoted as Tj (at border ) and Tj (close to border), 
respectively. The easiest way to illustrate the meaning of these terms is to consider an international 
highway with distinct exits. The flow ‘close to’ the border is observed just before the last exit before 
one passes the border; the flow ‘at’ the border is observed on the border line itself.  In this case the 
border effect, relating to traffic on a certain link is measured as: 
B3 = 1-  {Tj (at border) / Tj (close to border)} 
This can both be applied to public transport services and to road transport. A typical example for 
traffic densities is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure does not reflect data on a specific international 
link, but a tendency that one may expect on a cross-border corridor connecting two cities. The 
general tendency is that flows on borders are much smaller than they are at some distance from the 
border. Major express ways linking large cities with neighbor countries display large differences in 
traffic intensities: near the large city they are very high, on the border they are much smaller. Indeed 
the major difficulties in so called hinterland connections of large cities usually do not appear near the 
border, but near the cities themselves. Of course the large difference in intensity depends 
considerably on the high population density around the large cities leading to a high demand there. 
In order to identify a border effect it is therefore better to compare traffic intensities on borders with 
intensities near borders (say some 10 km away), as done in the B3 indicator. 
The last approach is to compare the density of border crossing infrastructure at the border (for 
example: the Netherlands with a border length with Belgium and Germany of about 500 km has  6 
international railway lines crossing the border. This implies a density of one railway line per 83 km). 
Drawing an arbitrary straight line within the country would yield a considerably higher density. The 
latter can be approximated by the ratio of the length of the railway system in a country and its 
surface. For the Netherlands this would lead to a score of about 1 railway per 14 km. The 
corresponding border effect can be defined as 1 minus the ratio between infrastructure density on 
the border ID (border) and infrastructure density within the country ID (domestic):  
B4 = 1-  {ID (border) / ID (domestic)} 
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Figure 2. Border effect measured by means of traffic intensities at an international link between city A and city 
B 
 
Note that infrastructure density ID (border) is measured as number of crossings per km, so that the 
dimension is 1/km. Further, ID (domestic) is measured in terms of kms of infrastructure divided by 
the surface in km2. Hence ID (domestic) is also measured in 1/km, so that the resulting indicator B4 
is a dimensionless index as it should be. The advantage of this approach is that one does not need a 
demarcation of a border region. It just suffices to measure the number of border crossings of an 
infrastructure network. Further, indicator B4 does not take into account differences in population 
density. When border regions have population densities that are much lower than the average 
population density, one would also expect a lower infrastructure density on the border. It would be 
possible to refine the definition of B4 via standardization by means of population densities. The ideal 
refinement would be to also take into account the elasticity of infrastructure supply with respect to 
population, but that would be beyond the scope of the present paper. Given the relationship between 
infrastructure density and population density, indicator B4 should be interpreted with care. 
Indicators B1 and B2 are essentially identical. Both are based on origin destination (OD) flow data; 
the difference between them is that the first one is based on a complete model estimation, while the 
second one is based on a control group approach. Indicator B3 is different since the data used are just 
flows on a link; no OD flow data are needed. Indicator B4 is different again, since it is not based on 
flows, but on infrastructure supply.  
We now turn to an application of these measures in the context of European transport. An example 
of the first approach is given in De Jong et al. (2011) for cross-border commuting in this EJTIR issue. 
In this paper we present some results for the other approaches. Concerning B2, we present some 
results for rail. In this case T is measured as the number of trains between two cities. We compare for 
example the difference in frequency between Cologne and Mannheim (both German) with that 
between Cologne and Utrecht (Germany and Netherlands). The border effect in 1992 between these 
City B 
distance 
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two city pairs equals 64%, in 1999 it has decreased to 55%. For a larger set of cities (described in 
Rietveld, 2001) we find a decrease of the border effect of some 56% in 1992 to about 50% in 2009. 
Thus, we conclude that there is a substantial border effect, and this effect is decreasing. Further it is 
found that the border effect is larger for countries where a different language is spoken compared 
with countries where the same language is spoken.  
For the B3 measure we present as an example the cases of the A1 and A16 international highways 
linking the Netherlands with Germany and Belgium, respectively. The results are shown in table 2. 
Thus, the traffic intensities at the international highways are about 30 % lower on the border than 
they are some 10 kms away from the border. This underlines the discontinuity shown in Fig 2.  A 
similar approach has been applied to bus frequencies on the border, and at some distance from the 
border. Here, the border effect is considerably stronger: about 58% for a sample of border crossing 
bus services in The Netherlands. This is slightly lower than the 60-65% observed in 1992 (Rietveld, 
2001).  
Table 2. Border effects on international highways, measured by means of B3 
 Border effect 1996 Border effect 2008 
A1 (NL-DE) 35%  30% 
A16 (NL-BE) 37% 31% 
Source: AVV (1994, 2008) 
 
Table 3. Border effects (B4) for rail and highways based on infrastructure densities 
Border between countries Border effect based on infrastructure densities on borderline 
relative to border area 
Railway Highway 
Belgium- The Netherlands 0.90 0.79 
Belgium-France 0.80 0.71 
Germany-The Netherlands 0.88 0.69 
Germany-Belgium 0.75 0.64 
Germany-France 0.82 0.78 
Switzerland-Austria 0.71 1.00 
Switzerland-France 0.77 0.69 
Italy-France 0.88 0.84 
Italy-Switzerland 0.84 0.89 
 
The last border effect index (B4) focuses on the supply of infrastructure on borders compared with 
density in reference regions. Table 3 reports results on network densities for rail and road on 
borderlines, where we take density in border regions as a point of reference (Rietveld, 1993). As 
explained above, index B4 results from comparing the density of border crossings per km with the 
average density of infrastructure measured as infrastructure km per km2. We find very high border 
effects of .83 for rail and .78 for highways for the countries considered.  Thus, this table reveals a very 
strong effect of borders on infrastructure supply in border regions. Part of this effect may be related 
to the lower population densities in border regions compared with the average population density in 
a country, but it is clear that the countries considered here have large cities close to borders. To 
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mention a few: Antwerp, Enschede, Maastricht, Luxemburg, Lille, Strasbourg, Basle, Geneva. Thus, 
the gap between average population density and density in border regions will be limited, which 
means that the barrier effect shown in the table is really substantial. 
The border effects in tables 2 and 3 are not independent from each other. The first table shows a 
rather modest border effect, whereas the latter displays a very high effect. The point is that when 
there is a very small number of border crossing links as reflected by B4, this implies that border 
crossing flows are forced to make use of the small number of links available. This implies a 
concentration of international flows on the links, so that one may expect a relatively high share of 
cross-border traffic on these international corridors, as reflected by B3. Thus, B3 and B4 will  be 
negatively correlated. An implication of this funnel effect is that detours in international transport 
tend to be larger than detours in domestic transport. Clearly, for border crossing trips between 
regions further away from the borders the detour effect will most probably be mild, but for short 
distance trips between regions separated by a border, the detour effect may be substantial.  
The figures we presented above mainly concern the supply side of infrastructure and transport 
services. Part of the data refer to frequencies of local public transport and trains. For another part is it 
on the supply of physical infrastructure. Bringing these results together we find that there are still 
substantial border effects ranging from about .50 to about .80. The effects tend to be larger for rail 
and public transport compared with road transport. In all cases a tendency towards smaller barrier 
effects can be observed. The lowest border effect (.35) is found for B3, but as indicated above, this 
value may be expected to be low when there is a lack of border crossing infrastructure due to the 
funnel effect. 
In the next section discuss the low supply of border crossing infrastructure using a cost benefit 
perspective.  
4. A welfare analysis of the supply of border crossing infrastructure 
In this section we discuss the implications of borders on the supply of infrastructure from a social 
cost benefit analytical perspective. For this purpose we consider an international corridor with four 
nodes (A to D) in a two country setting as represented in Figure 3. The distances between 
neighbouring nodes are equal, and the border is in the middle between nodes B and C. The network 
consists of two domestic links (A-B, C-D) and one international link (B-C). The network is not 
congested. Note that this international corridor implies a serial network with two governments 
taking decisions on the quality of the links they are controlling. The quality indicator used here is 
speed. By improving the design of roads governments can increase the speeds on a link. 
 
 
Figure  3.  International corridor with four nodes and three links; improvement considered on A-B link 
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Twelve transport markets can be distinguished on this corridor: AB, AC,… up to DC. The domestic 
link AB serves 6 of the 12 markets (AB, AC, AD; BA, CA, DA), while the international link BC serves 
8 of the markets in this network (AC, AD, BC, CD, and vice versa). Assume that the four cities are of 
equal size and that speeds are equal everywhere in the initial network. Let d be the distance between 
neighbouring nodes and let speed in the initial network be uniform at the level s. Then travel time t 
between neighbouring nodes equals d/s. We assume that transport demand between nodes i and j (i 
≠j) can be specified as follows:  
qij  = c.[|i-j|d/s]λ (1-b.dij),     
where i, j are indicators of nodes A B C D, In this equation, c represents a constant, λ is the travel 
time elasticity, b (0≤b≤1) is the size of the border effect, and dij is a dummy with a value 1 when i and 
j are separated by a border, else dij=0. Thus, when i and j are separated by a border, demand 
decreases with a factor b. We assume the travel time elasticity  λ to be equal to -1
4
.  
We take as a benchmark the situation that borders do not play a role as a determinant of  travel 
demand (b=0). Then, Table 4 shows that when a border effect would apply of (assume) 70%, demand 
on the domestic link AB is reduced by about 32%. In the present network the impact of border effects 
on a domestic link is substantial since domestic links are located close to the border. Further, demand 
on the international link would –of course- be reduced by 70%.   
Table 4.  Travel demand effects of investing in domestic versus international links, with and 
without border effects 
 Without border effect on travel demand With border effect on travel demand 
Travel 
demand 
before 
investment 
Travel 
demand after 
investment 
Change in 
travel 
demand 
Travel 
demand 
before 
investment 
Travel 
demand 
after 
investment 
Change in 
travel 
demand 
Investment in 
domestic link 
AB 
1000 1081 +81 
 
682 749 +67 
 
Investment in  
international 
link BC 
1272 1368 +96 382 410 +28 
 
Note: travel demand has been scaled such that demand at the domestic link equals 1000 in the absence of  border 
effects. 
 
Table 4 also shows that when border effects would not play a role, initial demand at the international 
link is higher than at the domestic link, the reason being that in this case BC has a more central 
position in the corridor. Thus, absent border effects, BC would be a more promising link to be 
improved compared with AB. This will be explored in more detail in a welfare analysis further in 
this section. However, with a border effect of 70% this initial favorable position of the international 
link no longer holds, since demand at international links is more strongly affected by the border 
effect than demand on domestic links.  
                                                      
4 This value of the elasticity would follow from the constant travel time property (see for example Mokhtarian and 
Chen, 2004). 
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Table 4 also shows the effects of an investment on specific links AB and BC. It is assumed that after 
the investment, speed is 10% higher on the link. The table shows that without border effects, an 
improvement of the international link induces the largest travel demand increase on that link (+96 on 
a scale with a reference value of 1000). Border effects lead to a large reduction of this increase to only 
+28. The border impact is much smaller on the domestic link (from +81 to +67). The evident lesson of 
Table 4 is that borders lead to less traffic, in particular on border-crossing infrastructure. Investment 
will be less effective to raise demand in this case. Hence, a low supply of border crossing 
infrastructures as found in section 3 is not necessarily a sign of undersupply: there is just less need 
for investment here. 
There is, however, another issue related to border crossing infrastructure that influences decision 
making: national governments do not consider positive spill-overs on foreign citizens in the cost 
benefit analysis of investment projects (Eijgenraam et al., 2000). The point is that investments are 
usually financed via domestic tax payers and then it makes sense that only benefits to domestic users 
are taken into account. As we will see this has strong detrimental effects on border-crossing 
infrastructure in this model. We will examine this by means of social cost benefit analysis of 
investment in the domestic (AB) versus the international (BC) link. The interference with the border 
effect will be taken into account by comparing the case with and without border effects. Hence we 
arrive at the 8 different cases presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 shows that without border effects, with a co-operative approach of both governments the 
international project BC yields the higher increase in consumer surplus as the result of the 
investment (1269) versus an increase resulting from improving the domestic link (1000). In the case 
that a government only considers domestic benefits, the rank order of the two alternatives is 
reversed (777 versus 635), Considering the case that a government only improves the part of the link 
on its own territory up to the border will not really change this effect. It would imply that the speed 
of the cross-border trip between B and C is not reduced with 10% but only with 5%. This would 
about halve both the consumer surplus and the costs of the investment. We find that a zero weight 
assigned to foreign beneficiaries makes international links tumble on priority rankings of investment 
projects. 
Table 5. Change in consumer surplus owing to investment in domestic versus international link; 
with and without border effects in transport demand 
 Change in consumer surplus: 
 Without  border 
effect; 
Without 
discounting of 
foreign welfare 
effects 
Without border 
effect; 
With discounting of 
foreign welfare 
effects 
With  border 
effect; 
Without 
discounting of 
foreign welfare 
effects 
With border effect; 
With discounting of 
foreign welfare 
effects 
10% speed increase on 
domestic link AB 
1000 777 687 620 
10% speed increase on 
international link BC 
1269 635 381 190 
Note: change in consumer surplus has been scaled such that surplus change owing to a 10% speed increase on the 
domestic link equals 1000 in the absence of border effects. 
 
These findings are entirely in line with the literature on capacity choice in a serial road network with 
governmental competition (De Borger et al. 2007, Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008, Mun and Nagakawa 
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2008, 2010). This literature shows that non-cooperative behavior of governments controlling different 
parts of a corridor has substantial negative effects on total welfare compared with the first best case 
of cooperative behavior. The standard practice of ignoring external benefits in cost benefit analysis is 
a clear example of non-cooperative behavior. 
The case discussed by Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) is on policy competition between two regions 
where transport demand is not influenced by the existence of the border between the two regions. 
This is typically the case with regions within the same country. The additional consequences of the 
border effect on the performance of investing in AB versus BC are shown in the right hand part of 
Table 5. There we find that welfare on the international link BC is much more strongly affected by 
the border effect than welfare on the domestic link AB, so that the domestic link easily reaches the 
top in the ranking. This would even be stronger when welfare gains of foreigners are ignored (the 
initial ranking of change in consumer surplus in AB versus BC of 1000 versus 1269 is reversed into 
620 versus 190). 
 Table 5 presents the effects of two entirely different factors explaining the low supply of 
international links that we observed in section 3 with border effects of about 0.8: lack of demand for 
international transport, and lack of political weight given to consumer surplus of foreigners. From a 
welfare viewpoint, the two forces hampering the development of international infrastructure must 
be valued differently, however. The reduction in demand due to border effects is indeed a valid 
element that deserves to be accounted for in cost benefit analysis of both domestic and international 
projects. Low supply of border crossing infrastructure due to low demand just follows the logic of 
economics based cost benefit analysis. The possible claim that international infrastructure links 
would deserve priority because of their ‘strategic importance’ compared with domestic links is not 
valid from this viewpoint (see Exel et al. 2002).  This is different with the second factor that hampers 
cross-national infrastructure, i.e., the rule that cost benefit analysis ignores  welfare effects accruing 
to foreigners. From an overall welfare perspective the latter factor would lead to a misallocation of 
domestic versus international projects.  
5. Policy implications 
What are the policy implications of this analysis? A first implication is that social cost benefit analysis 
of projects with an international dimension should present results of a sensitivity analysis, where in 
addition to the base line approach sketched above also a variant is shown where foreign benefits are 
represented. This is a helpful tool to detect international projects with positive net benefits. 
A second implication is that by interpreting an international link as a joint project both countries may 
gain from its implementation. This would call for cooperation. Game theory makes clear that there is 
no unique solution, since there are many ways in which costs and benefits of a project can be shared. 
For example, in the case of the international project with investment cost equal to 300, any 
distribution of these costs within the range of 110 to 190 would yield a positive result for both 
countries. A ‘fair’ solution would be a 50-50 distribution of costs, but that is not necessarily what 
would be the final result of negotiations. Just consider the case where the border is not in the middle 
of cities B and C, but much closer to city B so that 20% of the construction would take place in 
country 1 and 80% in country 2, leading to costs of 240 versus 60. If costs would just be distributed 
according to the length of the trajectory in both countries it is clear that  country 2 would not 
participate: since its costs would fall outside the range of 110 to 190. This will lead to (Coasian) 
negotiations between the two countries on the level of subsidy flowing from country 1 to country 2. 
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Lack of trust and high transaction costs may make the joint construction of such projects a difficult 
matter. What one sometimes observes is that a supranational authority such as the EU may provide 
some support by an extra subsidy for trans-European networks (TEN-T). However, Sichelschmidt 
(1999) emphasizes the experience with TENT-T projects that the risks of strategic behaviour of 
member states to present mainly domestic projects as ‘trans European’ are substantial. Therefore the 
policy of bilateral cooperation between neighbor countries may in the end be a better way to deal 
with cross-border surpluses than involving supranational bodies. 
An interesting case of a subsidy is the Emslandlinie in the Western part of Germany, close to the 
German border The point is that the express way is entirely located in Germany, but that it is also 
useful for Dutch car drivers for certain origin-destination combinations with the country. The 
German and Dutch governments agreed that the express way would be built with a contribution of 
about 10% in the construction costs by Dutch national and regional governments.  
Another interesting example concerns the connection between the port of Antwerp and the North 
Sea via the West Scheldt river.  The point is that the port of Antwerp, located in Belgium is a strong 
competitor of the Dutch port of Rotterdam. For its connection with the sea, the ships have to pass 
Dutch territory. There has been a long history of distrust between the two countries originating in 
the Westphalia peace treaty (1648) that allowed the Netherlands the blockage of water transport to 
Antwerp for about 150 years. Given the lack of interest of the Netherlands to keep the West Scheldt 
River navigable for large sea vessels, the two countries agreed that the entire dredging costs of the 
Dutch river will be borne by Belgium. This is almost the opposite of the Emslandlinie case because 
here the contribution of the foreign party is only 10 versus 100% in the West Scheldt case.  
These cases illustrate that negotiations on sharing costs of cross-border links may well lead to 
solutions where both parties agree to contribute. But it is clear that in addition to the two handicaps 
of cross-border projects mentioned above, transaction costs are a potential additional bottleneck. 
Another range of policy implications concerns the relevance of border effects in the valuation of 
international projects. Proost et al. (2011) find that only 12 out of 22 TEN-T projects adopted by the 
EU have a social rate of return of 5% or above, thus including all international benefits. A wide range 
of factors may play a role here. The performance of a project depends of course strongly on network 
structures and more in particular on the existence of well performing alternatives of the TEN-T 
projects. An explanation from an entirely different domain concerns political economy based pork 
barrel strategies of lobby groups and national governments to let international parties contribute to 
the costs of projects. But an important part of the explanation no doubt concerns the barrier effects of 
borders that lead to low demand for the projects. A related finding of Proost et al. (2011) is that the 
international share of the benefits of the 22 TEN-T is not as high as one might expect (the median 
value is about 10% only). This shows that what is presented as an international project in order to get 
access to additional funding opportunities may is not always as international as is claimed.  
These experiences underline the importance of the use of social cost benefit analysis as a tool for the 
valuation of both domestic and international projects. When cost benefit analysis is carried out along 
the lines sketched above it may well contribute to picking the really most beneficial projects by 
avoiding overinvestment in cross-border links due to underestimation of barrier effects of borders, 
and underinvestment due to ignoring international benefits of such projects.  
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6. Conclusions 
The creation of the common market and the Maastricht treaty have led to a reduction of border 
related barriers to European transport. But these barriers continue to exist and are still of 
considerable size. This is no surprise given the various economic and non-economic dimensions of 
the barriers surveyed in section 2. Depending on the type of infrastructure and transport mode (road, 
rail, bus)we find that there are still substantial border effects ranging from .30 to about .70. The 
overall tendency during the past 15 years is a gradual –though modest- decline of the border effect. 
Our analysis of cross-border transport services by various modes of collective transport reveals a 
double effect of borders. The first effect concerns the demand side: because demand for cross- border 
interaction is lower than for other destinations, the supply frequencies are lower as well. This supply 
effect will have an additional negative effect on cross-border interaction because of the lower 
frequencies. Thus, we observe the phenomenon that (demand related) barriers to cross-border 
transport flows create additional (supply related) barriers. Note that from a social welfare viewpoint, 
the low supply of capacity on infrastructure links is natural result: the optimal level of supply will 
follow the level of demand. 
Our paper identified another reason why international links tend to perform less favourably than 
domestic links in cost benefit analysis of projects. Standard rules of social cost benefit analysis imply 
that benefits accruing to foreign actors may be ignored since they do not contribute to the finance of 
the project as tax payers (except in the case of toll roads). Our analysis reveals that this will easily 
provide a serious handicap for international projects implying a reduction in net benefits of up to 
50%. 
International cooperation between border countries and active supranational parties such as the EU 
may help to overcome the latter bottleneck. However, transaction costs may be high implying slow 
progress on international projects. Nevertheless, with the decreasing sensitivity of cross-border 
traffic to the existence of borders, the benefits of transnational cooperation tend to increase and this 
also means that we may expect an increasing number of transnational links to be completed. 
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